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Abstract:  Why did OPEC not cut oil production in the wake of 2014’s price fall? This study aims at aiding the 
mostly qualitative discussion with quantitative evidence from computing quarterly partial market equilibria Q4 
2011 – Q4 2015 under present short-term profit maximisation and different competition setups. Although the 
model performs reasonably well in explaining pre-2014 prices, all setups fail to capture low prices, which fall 
even beyond perfect competition outcomes. This result is robust with respect to large variations in cost 
parameters. Rejecting present short-term profit maximisation, as well as a qualitative discussion of Saudi 
Arabian politics and the shale oil revolution, lead to the conclusion that the price drop of 2014-16 was most 
plausibly the result of an attempt to defend market shares and to test for shale oil resilience, besides being 
fuelled by other factors such as rising competitiveness of alternative technologies. Although shale oil might 
have increased competition permanently (as supported by model results), the agreement of December 2016 
should not be misunderstood as an OPEC defeat.  
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1. Introduction 
The 2014-2016 drop in crude oil prices has been researched extensively by oil market analysts. Although 
results have given evidence for a variety of drivers, including decreased demand and geopolitical 
circumstances, the shale oil revolution is widely considered to be the main driver of price developments. 
Since 2012, crude oil production capacities in the US have nearly doubled due to the rapid growth of its 
shale oil industry. The term ‘shale’ refers (imprecisely) to conventional oil trapped in low-permeability 
formations and extracted by unconventional methods such as hydraulic fracking and horizontal drilling.   
Why OPEC did not respond to the expanding shale production and falling prices with production cuts 
remains an open question. Other researchers’ results in these regards fall into three main categories: (1) 
OPEC tried to defend its market share by flooding the market in an attempt to drive out shale producers; (2) 
the shale oil revolution nullified OPEC’s market power, leaving its members no choice but to accept low 
prices; and (3) OPEC was uncertain about the potential of shale oil and needed to test its performance under 
low prices (Background section). 
However, most discussion of OPEC’s intensions are purely qualitative, with little or no quantitative evidence. 
This paper aims to bridge this gap with insights from computational equilibrium modelling. Specifically, I 
construct a model of the global crude oil market from 2011Q4 through 2015Q4 and compute market 
outcomes numerically under different competition setups for each quarter (Model section). The model, 
which is in an extension of the framework proposed by Huppmann (2013), does not aim to provide a 
comprehensive picture of the crude oil market, but rather an understanding of whether prices pre- and post-
drop can be explained within one common framework of business-as-usual competition. Subsequently, I 
embed the results in an extended discussion about the nature of shale oil and oil politics; especially the 
different strategic and economic factors that might influence Saudi Arabia.  
The inability of short-term profit maximisation to explain low prices (despite a reasonable model fit until late 
2014) allows me to reject the claim that developments are the sole outcome of changes in market 
fundamentals and static competition (Results section). This is robust with respect to changes in the cost 
parameters, such that (a possibly not captured) increased efficiency of shale producers over time is unlikely 
to change this result. In the context of actual events and the deferred decision to cut production in 2016, I 
conclude that initial OPEC policy aimed at defending market shares against shale oil and at evaluating the 
elasticity of shale supply (Discussion section). The latter turned out to be more robust and resilient than 
expected, besides fiscal pressure from the burden of low prices on oil-dependent OPEC economies. Further 
developments, such as increasing pressure from climate change policies, might have strengthened incentives 
to flood the market, along with national politics. Saudi-Arabian-led efforts to negotiate a deal, ultimately 
reached in December 2016, should not (necessarily) be interpreted as the abandoning of previous strategies 
or as an OPEC defeat, even though the shale revolution may have permanently altered the market structure, 
with prices unlikely to return to pre-2014 values. This is supported by a counterfactual model setup in which 
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OPEC acts as a single entity without regard to the profit distribution among its members, revealing high 
prices might require a coordination on high production cuts that is politically infeasible. 
As mentioned, despite a large literature discussing the issue, including, for example, Baffes et al. (2015); 
Baumeister and Kilian (2016); Dale (2016); Fattouh et al. (2016); Khan (2017), and Aguilera and Radetzki 
(2015), the only study featuring a comprehensive formal discussion and a numerical calibration is Behar and 
Ritz (2017). However, their quantitative part is limited to predicting the strategic decision between defending 
market share and maximising short-term profit. 
2. Background 
2.1 The falling price puzzle 
After the steep rise in 2008, oil prices remained on a high level until late 2014, when prices started falling. 
Figure 1 depicts the price trajectory from 2011 to 2015, which is the period relevant for this study. Quarterly 
prices fluctuate around an average of approximately 100 USD / bbl between 2011Q4 and 2014Q2. WTI 
Crude reached its peak quarterly in early 2012 with prices exceeding 110 USD / bbl. A quarter later it fell to 
80 USD / bbl; the lowest price in that era. Henceforth, I refer to this period as the “first part” or the “high-
price period” in contrast to the “second part” or “low-price period”: Between 2014 Q3 and 2015 Q1, quarterly 
prices dropped by more than 50%. Most of this fall took place during late 2014 and ended with a quarterly 
average barely above 40 USD / bbl in 2015 Q1. Subsequently, oil prices recovered slightly before falling in 
2015 Q3 even below.   
Another development taking place concurrently is the rapid expansion of shale oil, as shown on the right-
hand side of Figure 1. The United States is home to most known shale oil reserves, although countries like 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, and Russia are potentially endowed as well. The shale oil revolution is a main driver 
for the price-drop: its quick expansion led to an excess supply of crude oil that, in turn, put downward 
pressure on prices. This is what basic microeconomics suggests. However, as Figure 1 depicts, the expansion 
of US capacities was an almost smooth development over the years. Prices, in turn, exhibit an almost ad-hoc 
collapse such that identifying shale oil as the sole factor of the developments is economically implausible: It 
would require prices to react sudden and with a lag of multiple years. Baumeister and Kilian (2016) 
emphasise, based on an econometric analysis, that the price drop is a composite effect of positive supply 
shocks, negative demand shocks, and a shock in price expectations; however, they see demand changes as 
the main driver behind the price fall, with unexpected supply increases only influencing prices prior to 2014.  
Additionally, a number of other influential factors are identified in the literature. Ambiguous results have 
been found regarding the influence of financial speculation: While Husain et al. (2015) reject this factor 
specifically, Fantazzini (2016) find evidence for the presence of a negative financial bubble. The appreciation 
of the US-Dollar might have been another factor (Tokic, 2015); although some studies (Alquist et al., 2013; 
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Coudert and Mignon, 2016) fail to confirm significance or report ambiguities with respect to the direction of 
the currency effect over time.  
Dale (2016) describes the establishment of what he calls the new economics of oil. He links the 
developments to fundamental changes in oil market rules: Crude oil has become virtually non-exhaustible 
(and is priced as such) due to changed market conditions (tight climate policies, extensive discoveries of new 
oil fields, maturity of renewable technologies); the direction of global crude flows has changed eastwards, 
which leads to market lags, partially because of a rigid downstream industry; the global crude supply curve 
has become flatter due to quickly reacting shale oil; and  – even historically – OPEC has only been able to 
counter temporary shocks, never structural ones.  
The political risks of OPEC states has a strong positive effect on energy security and prices (Brown and 
Huntington, 2017; Chen et al., 2016). Hence, the relative stabilisation of Middle Eastern geopolitics 
influenced the developments. Needless to say, the region is far from being stable or even safe, but the 
decline in Iraqi oil production has been far less than previously expected, Libya even expanded its 
production in 2014 (despite internal conflicts), and improved relations between Iran and the West stabilised 
Iran’s output (Arezki and Blanchard, 2014; Baffes et al., 2015).  
No doubt, all these factors have influenced the price trajectory and are a solid base for a convincing 
framework. However, the core question of why did OPEC not intervene in order to increase oil prices by 
announcing a cut in production remains unanswered.  
2.2 Understanding and modelling OPEC 
Starting in June 2014, oil prices started declining moderately. However, following the OPEC meeting on 
November 27, 2014 and its announcement that there would be no production cut, oil prices dropped by 
more than 30 USD / bbl within two months. In December 2015, following a year of low oil prices, OPEC 
decided to continue production as before, implying an extension of de-facto suspension of production 
ceiling. Starting in early 2016, OPEC and Russia began negotiating a deal for production cuts. A final deal 
involving Iran was achieved in December 2016. 
There is no consensus regarding the actual reason behind OPEC’s initial decision to not cut production. 
However, explanations given by analysists fall into three main categories: 
• OPEC flooded the market with crude in an attempt to defend its market share and to drive out shale 
producers (Behar and Ritz, 2017; Brown and Huntington, 2017; Coy, 2015; Gause, 2015; Mănescu and 
Nuño, 2015); 
• shale oil has taken OPEC’s role as the swing producer and its members were forced to accept low 
prices (Baffes et al., 2015; Baumeister and Kilian, 2016; Dale, 2016; Kaletsky, 2015; The Economist, 
2015); or 
• uncertainty about shale oil behaviour made it necessary to test its resilience (Fattouh et al., 2016; 
Huppmann and Livingston, 2015).  
© 2017. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license  
Updated preprint of https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.09.010 (Ansari, D.2017. OPEC, Saudi Arabia, and the 
shale revolution: Insights from equilibrium modelling and oil politics, Energy Policy, 111, p. 166-178) 
4 
 
The first explanation corresponds to the basic idea of a standard market entry game: In a dynamic 
environment, if a market is contested by a new player, it may be rational for the incumbent firm to enforce a 
downward-pressure on prices in order to drive out the contestant, despite short-run losses for the 
incumbent. Behar and Ritz (2017) construct an algebraic framework with numerical computation. They show 
that flooding the market becomes the dominant strategy when shale supply and costs are high, non-OPEC 
capacities are large, and OPEC collusion as well as market demand are low; this has had been the case post-
2014. Notably, the algebraic analysis reveals discontinuous best-responses. This means that a switch to the 
flooding strategy occurs when parameter thresholds are crossed, which is why market prices may jump as a 
response to even small parameter shocks. However, for the market entry argument to work, the incumbent’s 
threat requires (i) credibility, (ii) effectiveness, and, at a minimum, (iii) temporal sustainability.  
The second major category of literature claims that these conditions do not hold and that OPEC had to 
accept the presence and dominance of US shale oil. The quick expansion of shale resulted in a new balance 
of power in the market: The quick responsiveness of shale oil and its vast capacities, even at low prices, 
create a competitive environment. Any quantity withhold by OPEC is immediately substituted with shale, 
such that OPEC’s decision was not a strategic one but rather the rules of competition left it no other choice. 
Baffes et al. (2015, p. 14) note that OPEC’s decision to freeze output, “implies that OPEC will no longer act as 
the swing oil producer [and that] . . . marginal cost of unconventional oil producers may play this role.”  
Lastly, a possible third explanation is that OPEC was driven by uncertainty and a desire for industry 
consolidation. Huppmann and Livingston (2015) describe, in addition to the possibility of multiple equilibria 
in the market, that a pragmatic OPEC most likely attempted to gain crucial information regarding shale’s 
performance in lower price ranges. Fattouh et al. (2016) express this argument in a more formal way, 
showing with a parametrised static game under uncertainty that, for a Saudi Arabia without sufficient 
knowledge about US shale elasticity, it is rational not to cut output, due to strict dominance of the 
corresponding strategy. Hence, Saudi Arabia had a large incentive to learn which game it is playing.  
The actual nature of OPEC and its objectives have been a topic of discussions ever since the organisation’s 
establishment. While some argue strictly that OPEC does not show cartelisation behaviour and should not be 
regarded as a such (Colgan, 2014; Kisswani, 2016; Plaut, 1981; Reynolds and Pippenger, 2010), others 
acknowledge OPEC’s nature as a cartel but with limited collusion and prices below perfect cartelisation 
(Almoguera et al., 2011; Huppmann and Holz, 2012; Okullo and Reynès, 2016). Domestic oil dependency and 
the role of oil for the international economy further complicate this debate by adding other possible 
objectives regarding geopolitics, welfare, and domestic stability to profit maximisation (Hochman and 
Zilberman, 2015; Kisswani, 2014; Schwarz, 2008). The same applies to non-monotonicities such as behaviour 
and effectiveness differing with the direction of price changes  (Alkhathlan et al., 2014; Loutia et al., 2016) 
Obviously, the complicated, unclear nature of OPEC is a central challenge for modellers, who have to 
determine strategic objectives and the role of competition in the market. Over the last decades, virtually 
every possible setup has been applied, ranging from competitive setups to unequally distributed market 
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power (for an overview on the different approaches, see e.g. Al-Qahtani et al. (2008)). Finally, Fattouh and 
Mahadeva (2013) offer a dismal outlook in this regards: OPEC’s frequently changing objectives and politics 
make its behaviour time-variant such that a unified modelling approach is prone to fail. 
3. The Model 
3.1 Structure and approach 
The framework is a so-called bathtub (or also pool) model. The term refers to all crude oil supply, regardless 
of origin or quality, being classified as one homogeneous good and facing a unified, global demand. Despite 
a general empirical indication for the bathtub market (Bachmeier and Griffin, 2006; Griffin, 2015; Gülen, 
1999), it does not reflect the complicated, multi-staged, and spatially diversified reality of crude oil business 
adequately. First, crude is classified, traded, and priced according to its characteristics that determine 
processing and refining; the most important indicator for this is API gravity. Moreover, refining facilities 
differ between various input types of crude oil, such that each refinery can only process a limited subset of 
crudes. Therefore, spatial conditions may have crucial influence on supply and demand, as emphasised for 
instance by Langer et al. (2016).  
As explained before, the complex and time-variant nature of OPEC and its objectives make it virtually 
impossible to construct realistic, consistent models of the oil market over a large time horizon. Moreover, 
data scarcity is a severe issue when fitting parameters for numerical models of the oil sector. Therefore, in 
this study, I do not attempt to construct a picture of the oil market that is necessarily accurate but rather one 
that reflects a stylised, simplified market and that is tailored to address the following question: Can low-price 
market outcomes post-2014 be explained by (short-term) profit maximisation, under whichever competition 
setup?  
For this, suppliers are assumed to maximise short-term profits under full information with temporal 
dichotomy, i.e. they maximise their profit in every single period individually, given production capacities and 
knowledge about each other’s costs and capacities. Hence, the model does not incorporate dynamic or 
signalling-based strategic behaviour. Although, at a first glimpse, this assumption seems to be inconsistent 
with the research question itself, it is both reasonable under usual market circumstances and important for 
accessing the issue. First, in normal times, crude oil producers have only little incentive to withhold (larger) 
quantities but they will usually provide whatever yields (short-term) profits, due to particularly high initial 
investments albeit comparatively low running costs and long project durations as they are typical for 
conventional crude oil. Since the market is dominated by large state companies and multinationals, it is 
reasonable to assume that – as a result of experience and research – they have profound beliefs about each 
other’s parameters (i.e. production costs and capacities). Most importantly, however, I use this assumption 
similar to a testable hypothesis: It allows me to answer whether market developments are actually consistent 
with standard static competition, or whether they arise most plausibly from dynamic calculus or information-
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revealing behaviour. In other words, the results’ ability to explain actual prices is used to (possibly) reject 
short-term profit maximisation as the underlying market behaviour.  
Basically, I assume a common partial equilibrium model with heterogeneous suppliers in static quantity 
competition under capacity restrictions. Competition takes place in quantities for both technical 
considerations (Bertrand’s paradox) and in accordance with the practice of crude oil business: Suppliers 
decide about the amount of oil to extract, while prices are determined in market equilibrium. Moreover, it 
reflects OPEC’s practice of setting quotas as output “recommendations” for its members. Formally,  
max
𝑞𝑖𝑡
 {𝑝𝑡(∙)𝑞𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝑖𝑡(𝑞𝑖𝑡) | 𝑞−𝑖𝑡
𝑠 }  ∀𝑖, 𝑡, 
where 𝑝 is the market price, 𝑞 is a supplied quantity, and 𝐶 are production costs. The subscripts 𝑖 and 𝑡 refer 
to the set of different suppliers and time periods respectively. Appendix A1 contains a table of notation as 
well as an overview of the algebraic relationships. In the different competition setups, the argument of the 
price function (an exogenous market clearing variable versus a demand function) and any knowledge / 
anticipation of the others’ quantities already produced / to be produced (𝑞−𝑖𝑡
𝑠 ) are varied.  
I assume a demand function that is linear in the output of crude oil. Periodical slope and intercept are fitted 
accordingly as a linear extrapolation from an estimate for the short-term elasticity of demand and actually 
observed market prices and quantities. Production costs are specified as proposed by Golombek et al. 
(1995), i.e. a producer-specific cost function that consists of a linear, a quadratic, and a logarithmic term. The 
latter diverges to infinity as a producer approaches their capacity limit. This setup allows for a marginal cost 
behaviour that matches the market’s technological constraints: For low and intermediate levels of output (in 
terms of production capacity), the additional costs of extracting a further barrel of oil rise only moderately. 
When reaching the production limit, however, the costs for additional oil extraction rise sharply. Moreover, 
in terms of modelling, this term provides a cost-based capacity constraint, since a profit-maximising 
producer will not incur these costs.  
Lastly, a slight relaxation to the strong assumption of homogenous crude oil is made. Quality differences are 
relevant for refineries (i.e. on the demand-side), since crudes of higher quality yield higher prices. However, 
adjusting demand is problematic in a pool model: It complicates the fitting of a unified demand curve 
significantly. Instead, another approach is to vary producer-specific costs: Each producers’ costs are 
multiplied with the quality adjustment parameter 𝜂𝑖 , which penalises (favours) suppliers of crude oils with 
lower (higher) quality with higher (lower) costs to maintain parity with a reference oil. Hence, heterogeneity 
is approximated by normalising crudes to a reference quality. This is to adjust a producer’s profit-margin for 
quality not via revenues but expenditures, leaving decision-making conceptually unaffected.  
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3.2 Competition setups 
Quarterly equilibria from 2011Q4 through 2015Q4 are computed for five different competition setups. Table 
1 provides an overview of the different specifications. Mathematical problem formulation is explained in the 
next subsection; the complete model formulation is presented in Appendix A1.  
In perfect competition, producers ignore their effect on the price and do not engage in strategic decision 
making; instead they maximise their profits in anticipation of a given price. This leads to a price-setting rule 
in which producers supply until reaching their marginal costs. Hence, prices are only driven by production 
technology, which is why perfect competition constructs a lower bound for the prices in an environment free 
of market power. Formally, the setup’s maximisation problem reads: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑞𝑖𝑡
 {𝑝𝑡𝑞𝑖𝑡 − 𝜂𝑗𝑡𝐶𝑖𝑡(𝑞𝑖𝑡) |  𝑝𝑡  𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛}  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 ,  ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑡 (1) 
In Cournot competition, all suppliers decide about their quantities simultaneously and in anticipation of each 
other’s decision. This means that producers take into account their choices’ effect on the market price. The 
result is a Nash equilibrium, implying that all suppliers provide quantities such that no one has a unilateral 
incentive to change their output. The corresponding maximisation problem is given by: 
max
𝑞𝑖𝑡
 {𝑝𝑡(∙)𝑞𝑖𝑡 − 𝜂𝑗𝑡𝐶𝑖𝑡(𝑞𝑖𝑡)}  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 ,  ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 (2) 
However, more sophisticated market structures might be present, especially due to an uneven distribution of 
market power or sequential decision-making. In the prominent Stackelberg game, one firm precedes 
another one by making a credible commitment to a decision, anticipating the reaction of the following firm. 
The latter decides in knowledge of the leader’s binding choice. In general, such a structure is desirable for 
the leader since it involves a so-called first-mover advantage, i.e. the leader’s market power enables him to 
yield larger profits than in the case of simultaneous decision-making. A general formulation of this game 
with multiple players is given by   
max
𝑞𝑗𝑡 
∀𝑗∈𝐽
 {𝑝𝑡(∙) ∑ 𝑞𝑗𝑡
 
𝑗∈𝐽
− ∑ [𝜂𝑗𝑡𝐶𝑗𝑡(𝑞𝑗𝑡)]
 
𝑗∈𝐽
|  𝑞𝑘𝑡
𝑅  ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾} ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 (3) 
𝑠. 𝑡. max
𝑞𝑘𝑡
 {𝑝𝑡(∙)𝑞𝑘𝑡 − 𝜂𝑘𝑡𝐶𝑘𝑡(𝑞𝑘𝑡) | 𝑞𝑗𝑡 ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽} ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 ,  ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 (4) 
where 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 refers to the set of Stackelberg leaders and 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 denotes the set of followers. 𝑞𝑘𝑡
𝑅  implies the 
anticipated reaction of the followers. Such a structure could be attributed to Saudi Arabia alone, or OPEC as 
a whole. Through the credible announcement of production quotas, non-OPEC suppliers choose their 
quantities in knowledge of OPEC target production. Concerning the followers, two different structures are 
possible: Either the followers themselves are endowed with market power and engage in Cournot-style 
competition in the second stage; or it could be the case that the followers behave competitively and supply 
the residual demand. The latter is called a competitive fringe. Three setups of this kind are used: First, in the 
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“United OPEC” setup, I assume an OPEC multi-plant supplier leading the market, i.e. OPEC acting as a single 
entity and maximising their joint profit. This setup constructs an upper-level benchmark: The resulting 
market outcome involves the highest exercise of OPEC market power possible. For the second stage, I 
assume Cournot competition. Secondly, I choose two variations of Saudi Arabia leading the market solely, 
first against Cournot followers and second against a competitive fringe.  
3.3 Data and numerical implementation 
The scarcity of reliable, disaggregated data for the crude oil sector is a central challenge when constructing 
numerical models. The issue cannot be mitigated entirely, but estimations and data choice are carefully 
made.  
The data incorporates 29 suppliers (including all OPEC members), accounting for 94.4% of the global crude 
oil production in mid-2013 (IEA). Despite the large market share included, demand is adjusted by a parallel 
shift to account for the demand lost by omitting minor producers; otherwise, upward-biased prices might be 
a result. Production data is taken exclusively from IEA’s Oil, Gas, Coal, and Electricity Quarterly Statistics 
(from 2013Q3 to 2016Q4). In line with multiple recent estimations (Caldara et al., 2016; Javan and Zahran, 
2015), short-term price elasticity of demand is set equal to -0.1.  
I calculate capacity data using two different methods. For OPEC members, IEA publishes estimates on crude 
oil production capacities in their Oil Medium-Term Market Reports. Final quarterly data is obtained using a 
cubic spline interpolation of IEA’s annual data. For non-OPEC suppliers, country-level capacity data on a 
global scale with public access is unavailable. Thus, their capacities are set based on actual production, 
assuming that 97% of the available capacity is used in each period. This approach is common for country-
level models in the crude oil sector (e.g. Behar and Ritz (2017)) and follows a simple rationale already 
introduced: (Conventional) projects are characterised by high initial costs, a long project lifetime, and 
relatively low running costs. Hence, outside of OPEC, suppliers have no official spare capacities and hardly 
any incentive to have such  (Aguilera and Radetzki, 2015).  
Data on production costs is taken from Huppmann and Holz (2012), Huppmann and Egging (2014), and  
Langer et al. (2016). Costs account for production only, meaning that capital investment is not included, and 
are assumed to not change over time: As pointed out by Aguilera and Radetzki (2015) and Aguilera (2014), 
production cost behaviour over time tends to show cyclic behaviour instead of monotonically increasing 
behaviour, and Toews and Naumov (2015) estimate that cost shocks have had no significant effects on oil 
prices. Nevertheless, constant costs throughout all periods bear the problem of not capturing a potential 
cost decline in shale oil (related to increased efficiency). To provide a workaround despite data scarcity, a 
sensitivity analysis with respect to costs is included in Appendix A4.      
For the quality adjustment parameter, I apply the following strategy: First, an OLS regression of a log-log 
model of prices for different crude oils and the crudes’ API gravity (U.S. Department of Energy) is performed, 
including dummies for temporal variation. Secondly, a virtual average crude (precisely, its API) is determined 
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for every supplier, based on differentiated firm-level production data from the Oil & Gas Journal and EIA. 
The quality adjustment index is then finally obtained as the inverse ratio of model-fitted prices for the virtual 
averages and WTI. Estimated adjustments range between roughly 0.97 and 1.13 with most (large) producers 
between unity and 1.06.  
All models are implemented in the software package GAMS. Cournot and perfect competition setups are 
formulated as mixed complementarity problems (MCPs) and solved via PATH solver (Ferris and Munson, 
2000). The Stackelberg setups are formulated as mathematical problems under equilibrium constraints 
(MPECs) and are implemented as mixed integer non-linear problems (MINLPs) via disjoint constraints 
(Fortuny-Amat and McCarl, 1981). As solvers, I use both BONMIN (Bonami et al., 2008) and Couenne (Belotti, 
2009). Cournot and perfect competition models behave regularly and can be solved quickly. Solving the 
Stackelberg models, however, proves more difficult due to non-convexities and corner solutions. The latter 
are the result of a high concentration in production capacities (Gini coefficient: 0.505), since only five 
countries account for more than 50% of global production (in descending order, Saudi Arabia, Russia, USA, 
China, and Iraq). In general, equilibria in Stackelberg are non-unique and are often associated with entirely 
different outcomes. In each case, I only report the equilibrium with the highest profit for the Stackelberg 
leader.  
4 Results 
4.1 Price trajectories and goodness of fit 
Figure 2 displays the resulting price trajectories for the different competition setups in contrast to the actual 
prices observed. Throughout the first part (until 2014Q3), computed prices form a channel around actual 
prices. As expected and intended, perfect competition prices are lower than actual prices and notably stable 
over time. They mark the lower benchmark of marginal costs. The two Saudi Arabia cases with fringe and 
Cournot followers, respectively, define a price corridor around actual prices with the former continuously 
below and the latter continuously above. Cournot competition leads to prices significantly exceeding the 
actual values, although the United OPEC case returns prices that overshoot actual prices by more than 200% 
in some periods.  
Overall, given the significant simplifications assumed, the model fit is reasonable (Appendix A2 contains a 
quantitative evaluation of the goodness of fit). However, after entering the second part (from 2014Q3 
onward), actual prices sink to a level that is not explained by any of the setups. Notably, this includes perfect 
competition, implying that prices sink below marginal costs for some suppliers. Hence, the modelling 
approach is inherently unable to explain prices following the drop. This confirms that short-term profit 
maximisation fails to explain low oil prices. As a result, given the model’s parameters, I can reject that the 
price drop is a result of static competition under full information. This leads to the intermediate conclusion 
that the price drop originates from non-static (i.e. dynamic or price-revealing) behaviour.  
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Remarkably, only Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the US experience major variations in quantities (Appendix A3) 
across the different setups. The additional supply relative to actual prices mostly originates from Russia. The 
result of actual prices sinking below marginal costs is robust with variations in the cost parameters by more 
than 30%, such that potentially overestimated costs are unlikely to be the driving force (Appendix A4). 
4.2 United OPEC and the price mechanism 
Analysing the United OPEC setup is beneficial for two reasons. First, it provides a particularly interesting 
counterfactual: Imagine OPEC was behaving like a joint, world-leading supplier similar to a united country. 
Such an entity would have been able to drive crude oil prices above 200 USD / bbl for short-term profit 
maximisation. Obviously, this is realistic by no means since the setup disregards any kind of individual 
incentive constraints for the cartel’s members and, thus, it does not regard possible (and in this case 
unilaterally rational) defections from the collusion agreement. The setup does not treat OPEC as a number of 
suppliers with different aims and egoist strategies, which contradict large sacrifices by a single supplier for 
the better of the whole.  
This, in turn, leads to the second benefit from studying this example: The United OPEC scenario explains 
substitutions and price mechanisms in the market. Figure 3 depicts OPEC profits and supply in 2015Q1. 
Obviously, the joint OPEC profit in United OPEC exceeds profits from Cournot equilibria. However, Saudi 
Arabia’s optimal profit shrinks considerably with United OPEC while the others’ profits rise. The underlying 
strategy is as follows: Market leader Saudi Arabia is able to cut approximately half of its production, which 
elevates the price. Although the kingdom’s profits diminish due to the large reduction, the resulting value 
effect via other OPEC members’ production outweighs the loss in Saudi Arabian profit, such that the joint 
net profit of a unilateral cut is positive.  
As previously noted, such a strategy is not incentive compatible in a real-world environment. Still, beyond 
being an interesting counterfactual, it reveals a major obstacle for OPEC: Given the large expansion of 
Russian and US production capacities, a modest production cut will only cause a gentle price response, since 
much of the quantity offset will be substituted by non-OPEC suppliers. To cause prices to rise above 100 
USD / bbl, Saudi Arabia would need to announce a production cut that leaves itself worse off than in a 
nearly competitive equilibrium.  
5 Discussion 
The modelling results have shown that short-term profit maximisation is unable to explain low oil prices: 
While the model has a reasonably good performance before the price-drop, prices after late 2014 were even 
below results for perfect competition. Hence, model results suggest that some suppliers were driven below 
marginal costs and voluntarily accepted short-term losses, in particular the US and Russia. Moreover, along 
the price drop, revenues of OPEC members shrank considerably. This supports the view that OPEC has not 
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switched to competitive behaviour, but that the price drop is a result of an exercise of market power in the 
presence of rigid supply.  
However, how can this finding be combined with the fact that an agreement to cut production has been 
reached in late 2016, supposedly abandoning this strategy? The following subsections elaborate on this 
question by analysing strategies for OPEC and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as its dominant actor, the 
performance of US shale, the influence of domestic politics, and, lastly, the role of Russia.  
5.1 Saudi calculus: market share or revenue? 
The decision-making process of Saudi Arabia can be characterised by a simple trade-off between present 
revenues and market-shares (see Fattouh et al. (2016) for an extensive discussion). Given fixed technology 
and investment decisions in the short-run, profit maximisation largely amounts to maximising revenues, 
given the often-low operational costs of Saudi Arabia and other OPEC producers. As such, generating higher 
revenues might have required reduced production and higher prices, as the model results show with the 
outcomes of short-term profit maximisation. 
However, securing long-run profits may have rather required to defend market shares, i.e. to continue to 
supply even under low prices to decrease the influence of emerging shale oil and to hedge against 
technological innovation on either supply or demand side. Incentivised by high prices, shale technology has 
developed quickly, and similar developments have occurred on the demand side by cost-declines in 
renewables, increased energy efficiency, and substituting technologies. Previous fears of peak oil have 
replaced with concerns about peak demand, as also tightening climate policies may shift an even larger 
share of the primary energy mix away from oil. As such, low prices could – in principle – both secure market 
shares by driving out shale and cause a decelerated diffusion of renewable energies and alternative 
technologies, implying finally larger profits in the long run.  
To some extent, similarities to Saudi Arabia’s behaviour during the 1980s can be spotted. At that time, 
during the oil price spike, OPEC members broadly cheated on production quotas in order to exploit high 
prices, while western importers sought to decrease their dependency on oil imports. As Richards and 
Waterbury (2009) note, the subsequent flooding of the market by Saudi Arabia, which led to a significant 
price drop, contained three central messages: Other OPEC members should stop cheating, non-OPEC 
members should understand that Saudi Arabia has much more endurance in this game, and oil importers 
should not watch out for alternative technologies since oil can easily drive them out of business.  
Moreover, crude is (at least believed to be) an instrument for geopolitics. Oil is an essential input for the 
current primary energy mix, while major industries and transport depend on it. Controlling a significant 
amount of both production and reserves inherently endows a supplier with political power. For a long time, 
this has secured Saudi Arabia’s political status in the world and, in particular, its relationship with the US 
(Krane, 2015). Hence, a new entrant in the market is not only a market contestant but also a political one, 
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and the kingdom defending its market share means not only it is defending future rents but also its future 
political influence.  
However, how much weight does Saudi Arabia actually assign to market-shares and geopolitics in the oil 
trade-off? Not much, according to Fattouh et al. (2016). Indeed, the decision may be taken by economic 
constraints more than political will. Regardless of any efforts to diversify a future Saudi economy, presently it 
is dependent on oil revenues (Albassam, 2015; Cherif and Hasanov, 2014). As the model has shown, the price 
trajectory was considerably below short-term equilibria, hinting at the decline in revenues. As Nusair (2016) 
estimates, Gulf Cooperation Council GDPs are closely correlated with oil price movements, although the 
strength of the effect is asymmetric with respect to the direction of price movements. Mohaddes and Raissi 
(2016) estimate an average 2.14% decline in GDP for Gulf Cooperation Council states as a result of the shale 
oil revolution. 
Low prices immediately hit the fiscal state of oil dependent economies. Fiscal breakeven prices of crude oil 
are rarely below 80 USD / bbl, and in the case of Saudi Arabia it was around 100 USD / bbl in 2014 (IMF). The 
consequence was a fiscal deficit of almost 20%. As a result, economic growth stagnated and, as part of 
austerity measures, project funding and wages in the public sector were cut, energy prices increased, and 
various taxes have been issued. For Middle Eastern economies that, in turn, broadly depend on government 
spending to finance implicit social contracts in the form of so-called authoritarian bargains (Assaad, 2014), 
losing the grip on oil revenues can easily cause unrest and bear a danger to the state itself (Ansari, 2016).  A 
glimpse of the latter was visible after a Saudi-Arabian increase in water prices was introduced and the 
respective minister had to be replaced following public complaints.  
Another point worth considering is the moral hazard Saudi Arabia is facing. Both OPEC and non-OPEC 
producers wanted Saudi Arabia to cut production after the price drop; but it quickly realised that such a cut 
would not necessarily be actively supported by other major suppliers such as Russia and Iran (Fattouh and 
Sen, 2015; Henderson and Fattouh, 2016). Even if such a unilateral cut was in Saudi Arabia’s interest, being a 
long-time guardian of the oil market at its own expenses does surely not, since it would only encourage 
other suppliers to expand their capacities even more.  
The intense struggles throughout 2016 to reach the final deal show that missing coordination had been a 
central issue: Despite promising advances at the Doha meeting in April, there was still no deal by August, 
when Iran refused to be part of it and the Saudi Arabian delegates reacted by withdrawing from the planned 
agreement. Only after Iran finally agreed to participate, the agreement was reached in December. 
Although Saudi Arabian oil politics might be questionable, it is inaccurate and wrong to claim their actions 
had admitted an “implicit defeat” (Riedel, 2016) by “blinking” toward a deal (Blas and Smith, 2016), since it 
was in a severe “financial crisis” (Daiss, 2016). Instead, as also confirmed by Fattouh and Sen (2016), the 
kingdom had insisted on certain points, mainly on not rebalancing the market unilaterally and demanding 
an increase in own revenues with any proposed action. Such targets are perfectly rational from both a static 
and a dynamic perspective, as supported by modelling results for the United OPEC scenario. Also, in many 
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regards, Saudi Arabia has been better prepared for low prices than others with large foreign reserves and 
still relatively low public debt (IMF).  
Low prices can even be interpreted as a welcomed support for Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman’s Vision 
2030 , which sees the country as an advanced, diversified economy with a strengthened private sector that is 
much less dependent on oil. Krane (2015) also sees a shift in Saudi geopolitics itself: The attempt to increase 
domestic refining, usually known to yield only small profit margins, shows that Saudi Arabia is growing out 
of its role as the US’s reliable oil supplier and trying to stimulate a further integration into the rest of the 
world. Huppmann and Livingston (2015) interpret increased Saudi activity in the refining industry as an 
attempt to climb up the value ladder of global petroleum.  
5.2 Shale performance under price pressure     
When analysing OPEC behaviour in the presence of shale, it should be clear that the organisation is facing 
“uncharted territory” (Fattouh and Sen, 2015) with shale oil, because it is structurally different from 
conventional oil. Conventional production projects typically last 30 years and the equity-financed investment 
is mostly undertaken by multinationals. Its cost structure is characterised by high capital costs but relatively 
low extraction costs. Shale oil, in contrast, involves lower investment relative to conventional oil, but higher 
production costs. The market is dominated by small, independent US firms; projects typically last one year or 
less, and the market is characterised by a high degree of financial leveraging. This, in turn, has strong 
consequences for the elasticity of supply; i.e. how quickly and strongly shale oil responds to changes in price. 
As depicted in Figure 4, the price drop hit the US crude oil industry hard. The number of rigs started to 
decrease substantially in 2015, declining by more than half. Expansion in crude oil production also came to a 
halt, and output actually decreased. Between 2015 and early 2016, more than 50 oil and gas firms went 
bankrupt (Reuters). This was mostly a result of the different market structure: Independent, leveraged firms 
in a short-term business (high production in wells usually lasts far less than a year) with smaller budgets and 
heterogeneous well economics even within a single formation are cut off from their financial streams as 
soon as the price falls below the breakeven point. However, the final impact on the shale industry was still 
less than many analysts expected, and clearly did not meet OPEC hopes. Moreover, it is reasonable to 
assume that the fast responsiveness of shale works in both directions: in the case of a price surge, financing 
of new shale projects might be issued, and the rig count would increase again. Hence, shale oil might have 
created a long-term price ceiling for crude oil.  
Another issue is the price channel for shale oil itself. Before the drop, virtually every researcher and market 
analyst estimated the production costs of shale oil as being between 50 and 100 USD / bbl (Aguilera and 
Radetzki, 2015; Brecha, 2012; Huppmann and Livingston, 2015; Livingston, 2014; The Economist, 2014). As 
we know today, this was an overestimation, since some shale firms were still able to supply at prices beyond 
30 USD / bbl (although many were not). Kleinberg et al. (2016) emphasise, however, the impact of a 
combination of exogenous and endogenous dynamics that led not only to a decline in relevant breakeven 
levels but also to a shift in the binding breakeven point, allowing shale producers to compete in low-price 
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environments. Wood Mackenzie sees shale breakeven beyond 40 USD / bbl. It is questionable as to whether 
OPEC and Saudi Arabia in particular have had perfect knowledge in this regard, and OPEC (2016) admits that 
shale resilience was above expectations.  
5.3 A change in Saudi politics? 
To correctly understand the shift in OPEC policy, one should take a look beyond time-consistent strategies 
and also consider the influence of domestic politics. Ali al-Naimi, the Saudi Arabian Minister of Petroleum 
and Mineral Resources from 1995 to early 2016, was reported to be the brain behind 2014’s decision and 
supposedly managed to convince all other OPEC members to join him (The Wall Street Journal, 2015). In an 
interview after the relevant OPEC meeting, he explained his position clearly concerning the decision: 
I will tell you why. … If I reduce, what happens to my market share? The price will go up and the Russians, the 
Brazilians, US shale oil producers will take my share. … It is also a defence of high efficiency producing 
countries, not only of market share. … That is the operative principle in all capitalist countries. … If the price 
falls, it falls, you cannot do anything about it. But if it goes down, others will be harmed greatly before we feel 
any pain. … I want to make one thing clear. It is unfair of you to ask OPEC to cut. We are the smallest 
producer. We produce less than 40% of global output. We are the most efficient producer. It is unbelievable 
after the analysis we carried out for us to cut. … Whether [the price] goes down to $20/B, $40/B, $50/B, $60/B, 
it is irrelevant.” (MEES, 2014) 
In 2015, Mohammed al-Sabban, a former adviser to al-Naimi, was still quoted as saying: “His biggest move 
was the latest one of defending Saudi market share, and abandoning the OPEC swing role” (The Wall Street 
Journal, 2015). The image OPEC and al-Naimi in person wanted to convey is unambiguous, at least: OPEC 
accepts the US’ invitation and is willing to enter a price war – no matter the cost. The cartel seems keen and 
determined to put inefficient suppliers out of business, and presents itself as being prepared for the storm. 
As detailed above, to some extent they had reason to believe so. Well-known, Middle Eastern oil is not only 
of decent quality but also has some of the lowest production costs globally. Gulf Cooperation Council 
countries, especially Saudi Arabia, had mostly low debt and high positions in foreign assets. And indeed, the 
number of shale rigs has declined quickly. However, defending market shares comes at a cost – costs that 
have proved unsustainable for some OPEC members.  Saudi Arabia too has seen itself faced with fiscal 
hardship, given that the decline in shale was beyond hope.  
Surprisingly, in early 2016, the kingdom decided to replace al-Nami with Khalid al-Falih as the minister for a 
newly founded composite Energy Ministry. In June, the new minister announced: “We will be very gentle in 
our approach and make sure we don't shock the market in any way. There is no reason to expect that Saudi 
Arabia is going to go on a flooding campaign” (Reuters, 2016). Was al-Naimi’s resignation the death 
sentence for the limited success of his policy and his inheritor chosen to make a U-turn? Or has al-Falih 
continued the legacy of al-Nami, who resigned after landing his greatest coup by challenging the new 
entrants, defending Saudi market shares, and revealing shale's potential under pressure? For anyone outside 
the kingdom’s government, the stories are nearly indistinguishable. Still, the coincidence makes it necessary 
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to consider that the change in policy did not necessarily originate in a consistent plan but could also 
represent a change in personnel and strategy.   
However, in reference to the points discussed above, ambiguity does not necessarily require a binary 
conclusion. A switch in policy – from flooding to cooperation – is obvious, but a change in the underlying 
principles is not. Al-Falih has been seeking a collusive agreement with major producers, but not at any cost. 
Throughout the negotiations, unilateral action has been rejected (“[Saudi Arabia] is not going to withdraw 
production to make way for others”, The Telegraph (2016)), and low prices increase Al-Falih's bargaining 
power with Russia, Iran, and the rest of OPEC. Ultimately, the oil price dynamics of recent years might have 
revealed that Saudi Arabia should be interested in neither low nor unnecessarily high prices, since the latter 
increase incentives for new technologies and market entrants, which is why balancing the market around a 
moderate price level is in the kingdom’s best interest.  
5.4 The Russia puzzle 
Yet, one puzzle remains from the model results. Remarkably, resulting quantities have shown that strategic 
substitution in the oil market takes place virtually between three players: Saudi Arabia, Russia, and the US. All 
other suppliers move in areas of their marginal cost functions that are still far below prices, so that no 
incentive is given to reduce production, and potential spare capacities are too low to change market results 
unilaterally. Yet, in almost all competition setups, model outcomes predict that Russian oil is produced 
above equilibrium values. In the second part, the outcomes even suggest that Russian output is on a level 
above marginal costs. In other words, the model suggests that Russia is voluntarily incurring losses for some 
of their sales. 
How reasonable and realistic is this is implication? If nothing else, it is not impossible, and is even supported 
by some figures: Rystad Energy and Morgan Stanley Commodity Research Estimates note that Russian 
onshore field extraction costs can reach as much as 70 USD / bbl. A number of reasons can be found to 
explain the presumed Russian overproduction. First, Russian oil production is (mostly) conventional, and as 
such there is a typical lag between price movements and supply adjustment, due to conventionals’ 
investment cycle (Fattouh, 2016). Multiple projects were initiated shortly before the price drop (Henderson 
and Grushevenko, 2017). Secondly, a market share argument similar to OPEC seems to be in place. As the 
Russian Energy Minister said, "[i]f we cut, the importer countries will increase their production and this will 
mean a loss of our niche market" (Bowler, 2015). Lastly, Russia has a state-led system of organising and 
taxing the oil sector that results in actual production decisions by extraction firms that do not depend on the 
nominal oil price itself but on a net producer price; and both differ substantially (Drebentsov, 2015). During 
the price drop, Russia widely profited from their reserve fund, which was dedicated for such events. 
However, low oil prices led to fiscal deficits, and the fund cannot sustain low oil prices for multiple years, 
which is why Russia was promoting the deal intensively (Henderson, 2016). 
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6 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations  
Huppmann and Holz (2015) explain that whether “shale oil investment [has] decrease[d], because OPEC 
strategically drove US producers out of the market; or [because] the current trend [has] just [been] a broader 
market adjustment . . . [e]mpirically, these two storylines are virtually indistinguishable.”. This statement is 
true to the extent that a definite answer may never be found.  
Still, this study has provided numerical evidence from an equilibrium model: Despite computing prices with a 
reasonable fit for high-price periods, the modelling approach, based on short-term profit maximisation, 
failed as a whole when it entered the low-price periods post 2014. This can be understood as evidence that 
low prices cannot result from static competition but have to arise from dynamic calculus or information 
games. In the wake of Saudi Arabian oil market politics and developments in shale oil, it turns out that the 
most convincing explanation for the model results is that OPEC attempted to defend its market share and to 
test for the elasticity of supply and survivability of shale in an uncertain environment.  
Saudi Arabia, as OPEC’s main actor, changed its approach when negotiating a deal with other OPEC 
members and Russia. However, in many regards, this change does not necessarily reflect a fundamental 
change in strategy. It might have been experience gained regarding the resilience of shale and its endurance 
under low prices that equipped the kingdom with both sufficient knowledge and leverage to reach an 
agreement that still adheres to a basic principle: Saudi Arabia refuses to undertake any unilateral action that 
would result in long-run moral hazard.  
Besides that, other incentives may have led OPEC members to accept low prices: Advances in renewable 
energies, alternative technologies, energy efficiency, and climate change policies alongside vast oil 
discoveries have turned fears of peak oil into fears of peak demand. To some extent, a market-share strategy 
might even prove beneficial in political terms when it comes to reforming previously mismanaged 
economies and deepening a more balanced integration in global politics and value chains, despite the fiscal 
hardship involved. Still, it should be kept in mind that any such oil market policy is no first best but has the 
primary aim of damage control in the presence of shale oil.  
Needless to say, the modelling approach is economically simple, and it requires numerous assumptions to 
work. It is true that the model cannot predict market outcomes for a precise matter, explain trade flows, or 
provide unambiguous insight into OPEC’s system of collusion. However, the model provides a scientific 
approach for accessing some major questions in a counterfactual way. Shortcomings concerning the data 
used for fitting the model are not a problem specific to this study but a general one for all applications in 
the crude oil sector.  
After the deal has (at least temporarily) brought prices back to more moderate levels, what will the oil 
market of the future look like, and which role will OPEC play in it? If it was not for global, fundamental 
shocks, it is unlikely that we would continue to see extraordinarily high prices. Supported by the model’s 
results, decreased demand and excessively expanded, mostly non-OPEC capacities have created an 
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environment of increased competition. High prices require fundamental production cuts (by Saudi Arabia), 
which are by no means feasible in the context of OPEC governments whose ultima ratio is not fraternity but 
competition.  
Shale is here to stay. Still, along with other recent studies, e.g. Brown and Huntington (2017), Fattouh and 
Sen (2016), Hosseini and Shakouri (2016), Matsumoto and Voudouris (2015), and Van de Graaf (2017) I 
conclude that this does not nullify the importance of conventional producers or OPEC in particular. The price 
recovery in the wake of 2016’s deal shows that market power is still a central variable and that OPEC remains 
a major force, although time-invariant policies on a national but also on an organisational level lead to 
frequent changes in the market reactions observed. Notably, neither OPEC nor innovating and climate-
ambitious importers have reason to desire steep price developments in either direction, as high prices will 
incentivise further development and exploration of shale, whereas low prices will reduce OPEC profits as well 
the competitiveness of alternative technologies, hampering their diffusion. Hence, the presence of shale oil 
could have introduced a price corridor for OPEC to act in, thus achieving something the market has barely 
seen so far: stability.  
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Appendix 
A1 Model formulation 
Table 2 gives an overview of the model notation. The Golombek et al. (1995) cost function is given by (5), 
and marginal costs by (6). Note that a numerical implementation usually requires the explicit formulation of 
a dedicated capacity constraint and a sufficient relaxation of the logarithmic term by an arbitrary small 
constant. Linear demand for each period is given by (7), and intercept and slope parameters are calculated 
according to (8) and (9) respectively. (10) is the capacity constraint. 
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𝐶𝑖𝑡(𝑞𝑖𝑡) = 𝛾1𝑖𝑞𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑖𝑞𝑖𝑡
2 − 𝛾3𝑖(𝑞𝑖𝑡 − 𝜅𝑖𝑡) (ln (1 −
𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝜅𝑖𝑡
) − 1) (5) 
 
⇒ 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 ≡
𝜕𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝑞𝑖𝑡
= 𝛾1𝑖 + 2𝛾2𝑖𝑞𝑖𝑡 − 𝛾3𝑖  ln (1 −
𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝜅𝑖𝑡
) (6) 
𝑝𝑡 =  𝛽1𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡 ∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝑖∈𝐼
 (7) 
β1t = φt(1 − ε
−1) (8) 
β2t = φt(χtε)
−1 (9) 
𝑞𝑖𝑡 ≤  𝜅𝑖𝑡 (10) 
The perfect competition model is implemented as a MCP with the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions (KKTs) of 
maximisation problem (1) subject to (10) and as well as (6) and (7). ⊥ is the perp operator, which implies that 
either term has to strictly equal zero.  
 
0 ≤ 𝑝𝑡 − 𝜂𝑖𝑡𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 ⊥  𝜅𝑖𝑡 −  𝑞𝑖𝑡 ≥  0 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼   ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 
𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾1𝑖 + 2𝛾2𝑖𝑞𝑖𝑡 − 𝛾3𝑖 ln (1 −
𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝜅𝑖𝑡
) ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼   ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 
𝑝𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡 ∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝑖∈𝐼
 ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 
Cournot competition is implemented as a MCP as well, consisting of the KKTs of maximisation problem (2) 
as well as (6),(7), and (10). 
0 ≤ 𝑝𝑡 − 𝜂𝑖𝑡𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 − 𝜏𝑖 ⊥  𝜅𝑖𝑡 −  𝑞𝑖𝑡 ≥  0 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼   ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 
𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾1𝑖 + 2𝛾2𝑖𝑞𝑖𝑡 − 𝛾3𝑖 ln (1 −
𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝜅𝑖𝑡
) ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼   ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 
𝑝𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡 ∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝑖∈𝐼
 ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 
All Stackelberg variations are implemented as MPECs via disjoint constraints. This implies the maximisation 
of (3) under the equilibrium conditions  (5), (6), (7), and (10), the KKT of (4), and the two disjunctive 
constraints to enforce complementarity between the followers’ marginal profits and their capacity 
constraints. The binary parameter 𝑓 enables a generic notation for the Cournot follower (𝑓 = 0) and 
competitive fringe case (𝑓 = 1). 𝑟𝑖𝑘 is a binary variable and 𝐵𝐼𝐺 an arbitrary, sufficiently large constant.  
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max
𝑞𝑗𝑡 
∀𝑗∈𝐽
 {𝑝𝑡 ∗ ∑ 𝑞𝑗𝑡
 
𝑗∈𝐽
− ∑ [𝜂𝑗𝑡𝐶𝑗𝑡 + +𝜏𝑗𝑞𝑗𝑡]
 
𝑗∈𝐽
} ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 
𝐶𝑗𝑡 = 𝛾1𝑖𝑞𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑖𝑞𝑖𝑡
2 − 𝛾3𝑖(𝑞𝑖𝑡 − 𝜅𝑖𝑡) (ln (1 −
𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝜅𝑖𝑡
) − 1)   ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽   ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 
0 ≤ 𝑝𝑡 + (1 − 𝑓)𝛽2𝑡𝑞𝑘𝑡 − 𝜂𝑘𝑡𝑀𝐶𝑘𝑡  ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾   ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 
𝑀𝐶𝑘𝑡 = 𝛾1𝑘 + 2𝛾2𝑘𝑞𝑘𝑡 − 𝛾3𝑘  ln (1 −
𝑞𝑘𝑡
𝜅𝑘𝑡
) ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾   ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 
0 ≤  𝜅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑞𝑖𝑡   ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼   ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 
𝑝𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡 ∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝑖∈𝐼
 ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 
𝑝𝑡 + (1 − 𝑓)𝛽2𝑡𝑞𝑘𝑡 − 𝜂𝑘𝑡𝑀𝐶𝑘𝑡 ≤ 𝑟𝑘𝑡𝐵𝐼𝐺 ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾   ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 
𝜅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑞𝑖𝑡 ≤ (1 − 𝑟𝑘𝑡)𝐵𝐼𝐺 ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾   ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 
 
A2 Model fit 
Goodness of model fit in the different setups is measured with the average relative modulus error (ARME). 
This decision is based on two central reasons. First, the metric must be invariant to the direction of a 
deviation, which is ensured by the modulus operator. Second, any absolute measure (such as a mean 
squares formulation) suffers from the variation in actual values themselves, i.e. an absolute distance measure 
would weigh deviations in high-price periods relatively higher than deviations in low-price periods. However, 
due to the method for demand extrapolation, the magnitudes for all results move closely with actual prices 
over time. Therefore, a shrinkage of the absolute error during the low prices or a trajectory’s direction 
cannot be interpreted as a better fit in comparison to the first period but as an endogenous effect. Hence, 
an adequate error metric has to lay equal weight on all periods. This is fulfilled by the ARME’s normalisation 
on each period’s price. Formally, the ARME of any setup 𝑠 is computed as 
𝐴𝑅𝑀𝐸𝑠 =
1
𝑇
∑
|𝑝𝑠,𝑡 − 𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡,𝑡|
𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡,𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
, 
where 𝑝𝑠,𝑡 and 𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡,𝑡 refer to the resulting price of setup 𝑠 in period 𝑡 and the actual price in period 𝑡 
respectively. | ⋅ | is the common modulus operator.  
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Using the ARME criterion, the Saudi Arabia versus a competitive fringe setup proves best throughout both 
periods (see Table 3), followed by perfect competition and the Saudi Arabia Stackelberg against a Cournot 
market. Obviously, the worst performing setup is United OPEC. However, there are large differences between 
the first and the second part. While the best-fitting model performs well throughout both parts, perfect 
competition does not perform well in the first part but only in the second. Its low overall ARME is the result 
of perfect competition, having the lowest prices in the wake of the unexplainable prices post Q4 2014. It 
should not be understood that perfect competition was a good approach to model competition in the crude 
oil market. The Saudi-Stackelberg with the Cournot follower, and the Cournot setup itself in a similar fashion 
perform considerably worse in the second part than in the first, with their ARMEs more than double the size 
in the former  
A3 Production quantities 
Figure 5 shows actual and computed production capacities for the cases of 1st quarter 2013 and 1st quarter 
2015 to include both a period of the first part and one of the second part. Spare capacities, shown in Figure 
6, are defined as the difference between production and capacity limit and may provide a better illustration 
than production itself.  
Actual spare capacities are mostly held by Saudi Arabia (KSA) and some other OPEC countries, with relatively 
small amounts held by non-OPEC suppliers. The best-performing Saudi Arabia versus Fringe setup involves 
slightly higher production in Q1 2013 and lower production in Q1 2015 relative to the actual case. In the 
former, the additional supply mostly originates from other OPEC members (which have no incentive to 
withhold any amount as part of the competitive fringe), while in the latter, Russia (RUS) and the US produce 
far less than is the actual case. This picture is consistent throughout all setups: in 2015, both suppliers seem 
to have supplied quantities beyond oligopolistic equilibria and – especially in the case of Russia – above 
marginal costs.  
A4 Cost sensitivity analysis 
A lack of adequate data is an omnipresent problem for research on crude oil markets. For this study, cost 
data is a central obstacle: The rejection of short-term profit maximisation as an assumption was based on 
actual prices falling below perfect competition levels, which are nothing but marginal costs for an interior 
optimum. To ensure the result’s robustness, a sensitivity analysis with respect to production costs was 
conducted. Figure 7 displays the trajectories of actual prices and perfect competition under different cost 
specifications (original costs as well as 10%, 20%, and 30% overall cost reduction). In each of the control 
cases, the cost for all suppliers decreased by the respective percentage. Results in 3th quarter 2015 can only 
be explained by perfect competition with costs as low as 30% below the cost data assumed. Actual prices 
from 4th quarter 2015 require an overestimation of production costs exceeding 40% to match perfect 
competition. Hence, the statement that oil prices sank below marginal costs proves robust with respect to 
large variations in cost parameters, strengthening the results and the intermediate conclusions.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: WTI crude oil price (left) and estimated production capacities of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the US 
(right). Data: IEA, Reuters, own calculations 
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Figure 2: Actual and computed price trajectories 
 
 
Figure 3: Computed profits (left) and production quantities (right) for the United OPEC setup in Q1 2015 by 
Saudi Ara-bia (KSA) and other OPEC members 
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Figure 4: Month-to-month and quarter-to-quarter changes in US rigs (left) and quarter-to-quarter and year-
to-year changes in US daily crude oil production (right). Data: EIA 
 
Figure 5: Actual and computed production quantities in Mbbl / day for Q1 2013 and Q1 2015 
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Figure 6: Actual and computed spare capacities in Mbbl / day for Q1 2013 and Q1 2015 
 
 
Figure 7: Robustness of perfect competition results with respect to cost variations (overall cost reductions in 
%) 
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Tables 
Abbr. Name Description Model 
PC Perfect competition 
All suppliers decide simultaneously as 
price-takers 
MCP 
Cournot Cornout 
All suppliers decide simultaneously with 
equal market power 
MCP 
KSA-CO 
Saudi Arabia – 
Cournot Stackelberg 
Saudi Arabia decides unilaterally in a first 
stage; all other suppliers follow in a 
Cournot game 
MPEC 
KSA-FR 
Saudi Arabia – Fringe 
Game 
Saudi Arabia decides unilaterally in a first 
stage; all other suppliers form a 
competitive fringe 
MPEC 
UNI-CO 
United OPEC – 
Cournot Stackelberg 
OPEC behaves as a single entity and 
decides in a first stage; all other suppliers 
follow in a Cournot game 
MPEC 
ACT Actual The prices actually observed in reality -  
 
Table 1: Overview of the different competition setups 
Set Indices  
𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 Crude oil producing countries 
𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 ⊆ 𝐼 Stackelberg leaders 
𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 ⊆ 𝐼 Stackelberg followers 
𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 
Time periods in quarterly steps from 4th 
quarter 2011 onwards 
Parameters  
𝛽1𝑡 , 𝛽2𝑡 Demand parameters 
𝜀 Price elasticity 
𝜑𝑡 Observed actual price 
𝜒𝑡  Observed actual quantity 
𝛾1𝑖 , 𝛾2𝑖, 𝛾3𝑖 Cost parameters 
𝜅𝑖𝑡 Production capacity 
𝜂𝑖  Quality of oil index 
Variables  
𝑝𝑡 ∈ ℝ0
+ Market price in period 𝑡 
𝑞𝑖𝑡  ∈ ℝ0
+ Quantity supplied by producer 𝑖 in period 𝑡 
 
Table 2: Model notation 
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ARME in % KSA-FR PC KSA-CO Cournot UNI-CO 
Overall  23 27 35 52 120 
First period  25 31 24 43 121 
Second period 18 18 63 75 119 
 
Table 3: Goodness of fit according to average modulus error (ARME) criterion by competition setups and 
time (lower is better) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
